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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 78-
2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Ann. (1992 Supp.) whereby the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over all appeals from the Circuit Court. 
"Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) gives the court of appeals jurisdiction 
over 'appeals from the circuit courts,1" State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. When a person is arrested for operating a vehicle without a 
license, never physically harming another person or property, and 
the state produces as evidence the testimony of the arresting 
officer and an abstract of the person's license, has the state 
denied the accused the right to confront the witnesses against 
her pursuant to the Utah Constitution Article I, § 12? 
2. Does the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, have 
original jurisdiction over a state prosecution of a Utah citizen 
for violating the Utah Motor Vehicle Code, driving a motor 
vehicle without a valid license? 
3. Where there is no physical harm to another person, nor to 
property, and no citizen's complaint, does the state have the 
authority to prosecute a person for violating a motor vehicle 
code statute? 
4. Do the state criminal justice laws regarding the prosecution 
of a person for driving a motor vehicle on a Utah highway without 
a valid driver's license, and reduced to a class C misdemeanor, 
deprive the accused of equal protection of the laws, by 
classifying her as a traffic law violator and as a result denying 
her the right to a jury trial and by relieving the state of the 
burden of proving the mental state of the accused? 
5. Was the testimony of the arresting state trooper that the 
accused was driving at a specific location and time, combined 
with the abstract of the accused's driver's license showing no 
valid license on that day, sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused operated a motor vehicle on the 
highways of Utah without a valid driver's license? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
a. Article III § l. "The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish." 
b. Article III § 2 f 1. "The judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under Authority;- . . . to Controversies between two or 
more states; -[between a State and Citizens of another State;]- . 
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. ."[and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects.]" 
c. Article III § 2 5 2. "In all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law 
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make." 
2. UTAH CONSTITUTION 
a. Article I § 2. "All political power is inherent in 
the people; and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have 
the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require." 
b. Article I § 11. "All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party." 
c. Article I § 12. "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right . . . to be confronted by the witness 
against him, . . . to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have 
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been committed . . . ." 
d. Article I § 24. "All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." 
3. UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
a. Article VIII. HEARSAY 
(1) Rule 801. "Definitions . . . (c) Hearsay. 
'Hearsay1 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
(2) Rule 803. "Hearsay exceptions; availability of 
declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness: . . • (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of 
acts, events, condition, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near 
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the 
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, 
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted 
for profit." 
b. Article IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION. 
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(1) Rule 902. "Self Authentication. Extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is not required with respect to the following: . . 
. (4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official 
record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by 
law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified 
as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make 
the certification, by certificate complying with Paragraph (1), 
(2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the United 
States or of this state." 
4. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
a. § 41-2-104. Operators must be licensed. 
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under 
Section 41-2-107, 41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2-
121(4), or Chapter 22, Title 41, may operate a motor vehicle on a 
highway in this state unless the person is licensed as an 
operator by the division under this chapter. 
b. § 41-2-118. Records to be filed - Suitable indices 
kept. 
(1) The division shall file every application for a 
license received by it in alphabetical order and shall maintain 
indices containing: 
(a) all applications denied and the reason each 
was denied; 
(b) all applications granted; and 
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(c) the name of every licensee whose license has 
been suspended or revoked by the division and the reasons for the 
action. 
(2) The division shall also file all accident reports 
and abstracts of court records of convictions received by it 
under state law. The department shall maintain convenient 
records or make suitable notations so that an individual record 
of each licensee showing his convictions and the traffic 
accidents in which he has been involved where a conviction has 
resulted are readily available for consideration by the division 
upon an application for renewal of a license and at other 
appropriate times. 
c. § 41-2-119(3) The division may prepare under the seal 
of the division and deliver upon request, a certified copy of any 
record of the department, charging a fee determined by the 
division under Subsection 63-38-3(2) for each document 
authenticated. Each certified copy is admissible in any 
proceeding in any court in the same manner as the original. 
d. § 41-2-137. Violation of chapter - Class B 
misdemeanor, A violation of this chapter is a class B 
misdemeanor, unless otherwise specified. 
e. § 76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction - Term of 
imprisonment . . . (3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, 
for a term not exceeding ninety days. 
f. § 78-4-5. Jurisdiction - Exclusive and concurrent 
[effective until January 1, 1992] . . . (3)(c) The circuit 
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court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice courts 
over violations of state statutes in municipalities where a 
municipal justice court exists. 
g. § 78-5-104. Criminal jurisdiction - Concurrent and 
exclusive jurisdiction - Preliminary examinations - Small claims 
[Effective until January 1, 1992] . . . (2)(b) Municipal 
justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit 
court over the following offenses committed within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court: (i) class B and C 
misdemeanors; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee stipulates as to the appellants statement of the 
case. 
FACTS 
1. On or about 12:35 PM, May 25, 1990, Appellant, Kitty K. 
Burton was driving her Blue 1966 Buick in the vicinity of 5600 
South 600 East in Murray, Utah. Record at p. 1. 
2. At that time Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Donald Christensen 
stopped Appellant, and ultimately charged her with operating a 
motor vehicle upon a highway in the State of Utah, without a 
license certificate § 41-2-104 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code. 
Record at p. 1. 
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3. On June 3, 1990 the State issued an information to Appellant 
for the violation of § 41-2-104 Utah Code Ann. Record at pp. 3-
8. 
4. At trial in the Third Circuit Court Murray Department on 
August 6, 1990, Appellant was given a bench trial, found guilty 
and was sentenced to $65 fine and 5 days confinement. All 
confinement was suspended. Record at pp. 12 and 15. 
5. During trial Appellant moved for jury trial and court 
dismissed motion. Record at p. 12. 
6. During trial Trooper Donald Christensen testified for state 
and identified appellant. Record at p. 12. 
7. During trial the State submitted one exhibit, a certified 
abstract of Appellant's driver's license. Appellant objected and 
the court accepted the evidence. Record at p. 12. 
8. On September 18, 1990 Appellant submitted her notice of 
appeal. Record at p. 16. 
8. On January 22, 1992 the Third Circuit Court Murray 
Department denied the Appellant's Motion for an order for the 
State to bear the cost of providing the transcript to the appeal 
record. Record (additional 3 page judgment not logged into 
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record nor numbered.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state did not deny the Appellant the right to confront 
the witness against her. The testimony of Trooper Christensen 
was not hearsay because, his testimony was not offered to prove 
the assertion that Appellant did not have a license. The 
trooper's testimony was offered to prove the assertion that on 
the 25 of May, 1990 he observed Appellant operating a motor 
vehicle at 5600 South and 600 East. The certified abstract of 
the license was an admissible self authenticating document. 
Because dragging the record keeper into court to testify for 
every driving violation will not enhance truth finding, it is a 
legitimate government objective to hold down costs and reduce 
inconvenience to the record maintenance officers. Therefore, the 
Appellant was not denied the right to confront the witnesses 
against her pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Third Circuit Court properly had jurisdiction. The 
distributive clause of Article III, § 2 of the United States 
Constitution confers original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court 
when a state is a party only when the Federal courts have 
original jurisdiction. When a state prosecutes one of its 
citizens for violating its own statute, according to Article III, 
§ 1 the Federal courts don't have jurisdiction and therefore, the 
Supreme Court could not have original jurisdiction. 
The state has the authority to prosecute Appellant in this 
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case. The state may prosecute a violation of its reasonable laws 
as a matter of sovereignty. The state may regulate traffic as 
part of its inherent power to legislate for the health, safety, 
welfare and morals. The prohibition against driving without a 
license is ci reasonable exercise of its police power and 
therefore, the state may prosecute violators of the statute. 
The state has not denied Appellant the equal protection of 
the law. The penalty of the act the Appellant is accused of 
makes it a "petty" offense and therefore, the appellant has 
gained no fundamental right to a jury. The procedure applies 
equally to all motor vehicle operators and therefore the 
Appellant has not been denied equal protection of the laws. 
The testimony of the highway patrol trooper and the abstract 
of the license are admissible. This evidence proves all elements 
of the violation and thus, is sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the Appellant is guilty. Therefore, the verdict 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN TRIAL BURTON CONFRONTED THE STATE'S WITNESS AGAINST HER 
a. Standard Of Review 
The Appellant claims the police officer's testimony was 
hearsay and that the driver's license abstract, also hearsay, was 
not properly authenticated, and because both were admitted she 
was denied the right to confront the witness against her. 
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Whether the evidence presented at trial was hearsay, admissible 
and properly authenticated is a question of law and thus, the 
court should accord no special deference to the trial court's 
conclusions, but review them under a "correctness" standard. 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991). 
b. The Testimony Of Highway Patrolman Christensen Was Not 
Hearsay 
The testimony of the Highway Patrol Officer at trial was not 
hearsay. "'Hearsay1 is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. of 
Evid. 801(c). In the instant case, officer Christensen testified 
for the state as to the identity of the defendant as the operator 
of the automobile that he stopped on May 25, 1990. Record at 12, 
State v. Burton. The testimony elicited from Officer Christensen 
by the State was not offered to prove the truth of the assertion 
that the appellant had no license. The testimony was offered to 
prove she was the person stopped and that she was the operator at 
that time and place. Officer Christensen directly observed those 
facts and thus was the declarant. Therefore, his testimony 
elicited by the state was not hearsay, and the appellant was able 
to confront the officer on his testimony. 
c. The Abstract Of The Appellant's License Was Admissible 
And Admission Did Not Deny Her The Right To Confront 
The Witness Against Her 
The abstract of Burton's driver's license was admissible as 
a "Record[] of regularly conducted activity" exception to the 
11 
hearsay rule. Utah R. of Evid. 803(6). 
In order to be admissible, a report or document 
prepared by a public official must contain facts and 
not conclusions involving the exercise of judgment or 
discretion or the expression of opinion. The subject 
matter must relate to facts which are of a public 
nature, it must be retained for the benefit of the 
public and there must be express statutory authority to 
compile the report. 
State v. Monson, 784 P.2d 485, 488 (Wash. 1989). In Monson, the 
defendant was stopped by a state trooper when the trooper 
observed the* automobile had expired license plates. The officer 
obtained a computer check of the defendant's driving record and 
discovered the defendant's license had been revoked. Id., at 
486. On appeal from conviction for driving with a suspended or 
revoked license, the defendant challenged the admissibility of a 
"certified copy of defendant's driving record" that the state 
sought to introduce "in order to establish that defendant's 
driving privilege was revoked at the time he was cited." Monson, 
at 488. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute 
that allowed the authentication and admission of the public 
record was a "codification of the common law public records 
hearsay exception." Id., at 487. In the instant case, the 
abstract of the license is admissible under § 41-2-119 (1988). 
The last sentence of § 41-2-119(3) states: "Each certified copy 
is admissible in any proceeding in any court in the same manner 
as the original." In addition, under the Utah statutes the 
license abstract satisfies the Monson test. First, the abstract 
contains only facts. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-118, ("all 
applications denied and the reason each was denied;"). Second, 
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the abstract subject matter relates only to license and 
automobile accident information, a matter of public record. Id. 
Third, the abstract is created for the benefit of the public, 
including the department of public safety and the individual 
concerned. Id. (see Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 
1978), ("statutes regulating those who have been given the 
privilege of driving are designed to protect the public . . . " ) . 
Fourth, Utah Code Annotated § 41-2-118 gives the Department of 
Public Safety the express statutory authority to compile the 
abstract. Therefore, the abstract of the Appellant's driver's 
license was admissible. 
The abstract of Appellant's driver's license is self-
authenticating according to § 41-2-119(3) Utah Code Ann. (1988) 
and thus, did not require the keeper of the records to testify at 
trial as to authenticity. "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as 
a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with 
respect to the following: . . . (4) Certified copies of public 
records." Utah R. of Evid. 902. In Monson, the court described 
the certified copy of a defendant's driving record as a hearsay 
statement. State v. Monson, 784 P.2d 485, 486 (Wash. 1989). The 
Supreme Court has held that when a party seeks to introduce 
hearsay evidence where the declarant is not present for trial, 
that party must make a showing that the declarant is not 
available and that the statement "bears adequate 'indicia of 
reliability[]•" in order to avoid violating the confrontation 
clause. Id., at 489, (quoting Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66, 
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100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). However in a later 
case, the Supreme Court modified the Roberts decision and said 
that "Roberts 'cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical 
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by 
the government without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable.'" Id., at 490, (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 
U.S. 387, 394, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the confrontation 
clause does not require "independent indicia of reliability of a 
statement admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 
Id., at 490, (quoting Bouriaily v. Untied States, 483 U.S. 171, 
107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). Even Roberts, included 
the public records exception as one of the exceptions that 
comport with the substance of the constitutional protection. 
Id., at 490. Due to the number of applicants for licenses and 
the time delay between application, denial, citation, and trial, 
the declarant "would be extremely unlikely to remember the events 
recorded. For that reason, cross examination would not serve to 
enhance truth finding." Id.. at 490. Therefore, the court in 
Monson, held that unavailability of the declarant was not a 
requirement of the confrontation clause in the admission of 
hearsay evidence. Id., at 491. In Utah the supreme court has 
held that § 41-6-44.3 Utah Code Ann. does not violate the 
confrontation clause by allowing the admission of intoxilyzer 
test results with only an affidavit of the machine certification 
and an affidavit stating that the administering officer followed 
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the proper procedures. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319 
(Utah 1983), (conviction reversed because the statute was not 
complied with). In Murray City, the court also held that it was 
a legitimate government objective for the court to relieve the 
state of the "financial burden and inconvenience of calling as a 
witness in every DUI case the public officer responsible for 
testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer machine and the 
ampoules." Id.. at 1321-22. Like Monson, the Utah public 
records exception in Utah R. of Evid. 902(4) is "among the safest 
of the hearsay exceptions." Monson, at 490. Like Monson, 
dragging the creator and the keeper of the record into court 
would not serve to enhance truth finding. As in Murray City, it 
is a legitimate government objective to limit the expense and 
inconvenience to the government when there is no violation of the 
confrontation clause. Therefore, the admission of the abstract 
of the Appellant's driver's license without the creator or the 
keeper of the record present to testify as to the record's 
truthfulness did not violate Burton's right to confront the 
witness against her. 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
BURTON'S TRIAL 
a. Standard Of Review 
Whether the Circuit Court had original jurisdiction presents 
a question of law and thus, the court should accord no special 
deference to the trial court's conclusions, but review them under 
a "correctness" standard. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 
(Utah 1991). 
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b. Third Circuit Court, Murray Division, Had Original 
Jurisdiction Over State v. Burton 
The Third Circuit Court, Murray Division, had original 
jurisdiction in the Appellant's case. "Municipal justice courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court over the 
following offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court: (i) class B and C misdemeanors;" Utah Code Ann. § 
78-5-104(2)(b) (1988, effective until January 1, 1992). "The 
circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice 
courts over violations of state statutes in municipalities where 
a municipal justice court exists." Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-5(3)(c) 
(1988, effective until January 1, 1992). In Cohens v. Virginia. 
Chief Justice Marshall first addressed the Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court over state court judgments in cases arising from 
prosecutions of state penal laws. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S.(Wheat. 6) 264, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). The Chief Justice 
addressed the meaning of the second clause in Article III, § 2 of 
the United States Constitution, on which the Appellant in the 
instant case justifies her argument. Chief Justice Marshall 
stated that in the distributive clause the reference to original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court where the state is a party must 
be related back to the preceding clause. The preceding clause 
describes Federal court jurisdiction. Marshall then stated that 
the Supreme Court can have original jurisdiction in cases where 
the Federal courts have original jurisdiction, and not where 
Federal courts do not have original jurisdiction. "Of the last 
description, is every case between a state and its citizens, and, 
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perhaps, every case in which a state is? enforcing its penal Inw.s 
In such cases, therefore the Supreme Court cannot take original 
jur i scliet ion " Cohens v. State, 19 U . S (Wheat. 6) 264 , 399, 5 
L.Ed. 257, 290 (182:P Tr> the instant case, I lie state prosecuted 
its own citizen for a violation of its traffic code and like 
Cohens, the or i gliia 1 MI 11 IIM> not be instituted in a federal 
court. Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot take original 
jurisdiction. 
JHE STATE HAS THE
 A P T H 0 R I T Y TO PROSECUTE BURTON 
a Standard Of Review 
Whether the State of Utah can bring an action in the courts 
against the Appelant j t. .i question ot law ami thus tin-- standard 
of review is again one of "correctness." State v. Humphrey, 823 
P. 2d 464, 465 (Utah 1'*<H ) . 
^ The State Has The Sovereign Knqht iv» PIONWI ule 
Violations Of Its Own Laws 
(1) Ki:a te Has ' 1'he K i q111 'To Pi o:->ecut v . 
The State f Utah may prosecute the Appellant for a 
*w tnat proscribes operating a motor 
vehicle without a valid driver's license. The state under a 
Federal system has sovereign powers. Among the commonly 
recc, i~ •> ? -*.*- y xiexa by a sovereignty is 
the right to prosecute, See, Commonwealth v. Webster. 470 A 2d 
532, 536 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983), (Grant of immunity by one state 
deprives another of i t„ r:; riqht lo prosecute1 and gravely derogating 
its sovereignty); State v. Hodgson. 740 P.2d 848, 851 (Wash. 
1987), (Statutes of limitation are legislative grace, 
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"surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute."). 
Therefore, assuming the legislature had the authority to regulate 
driver's licenses, the state has a right to prosecute a violation 
of that law, 
(2) The State Has The Power To Regulate Driver 
Licensing 
The Utah Legislature has the power to regulate driver 
testing and licensing. "'[T]he Legislature, in the exercise of 
its right to regulate the use of highways and of the inherent 
police power of the state, has the power to regulate 
circumstances under which automobiles may be operated upon the 
highways of the state.'" Humphreys v. State, 738 P.2d 188, 190 
(Okl.Cr. 1987), (quoting Brantley v. State, 548 P.2d 675, 676 
(Okl.Cr. 1976)). States have a recognized "inherent power to 
enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety, welfare, or 
morals of the public." City of Whitefish v. Hansen, 771 P.2d 
976, 976 (Mont. 1989), (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge Co.. 36 U.S.(11 Pet.) 420[9] L.Ed. 773. In City of 
Whitefish, the Appellant was found guilty of failing to have a 
valid driver's license, failing to carry automobile insurance and 
failing to renew his vehicle registration. Id. The appellant 
appealed pro se, raising claims that the District Court violated 
his constitutional rights and that the "issuing" court did not 
have the jurisdiction to try the appellant. Id. Following a 
"curt reply," the court reviewed previous decisions in finding 
the appellant's appeal was groundless. Id., at 976-77. First, 
the court recited a previous holding that, " [Regulations that 
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1
 - ** - * • . win ue presumed 
reasonable absent a clear showing to the contrary," Id. , at c»7/. 
Second, the court reaffirmed that it had "previously recognized 
the power of the Mtate to reyttiaie licensing of fir :i vers in tin 
interests of public safety." Id. Like Montana in City of 
Whitefish, Utah has the power to regulate licensing of drivers In 
the interests of public safety. Therefore, tl: le state 3 aw 
requiring a valid driver's 1 icense is a valid exercise of state 
authority tn legulate for public health, safety, welfare and 
morals, and the state has the power to prosecute the appeJ Lant as 
a right of sovereignty. 
(3) Article I § 11 Of The Utah Constitution Is Not A 
Limit On Which Potential Parties May Prosecute Or 
Defend In State Courts 
Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution is a limit on the 
power cil the legislating In rlosf? 1 he i oui fs mi potential 
parties o^t a ] imi t on parties themselves. "[T]he right to 
appear ±n person and prosecute or defend a cause to which he is a 
party cannot be abrogated eithei by the legislature or the 
courts." Nelson v, Smith. 107 Utah 382, 388, 154 P.2d 634, 637 
(1944) in Nelson, the State Bar Commission sought t .-> enjoin the 
defendants from practicing taw in accordant'v w :- a-.* D 
statute proscribing laymen from practicing law. The court held 
that the i.nn aid not offend the constitutional provision because 
Article 1# % 11 was a guarantee that neither the legi s] atui :e i nor 
the courts could close the courts to a person who is a party that 
lias a cause u( act i or.. Id.. Thus, tilie provision is a requirement 
on the state to keep open a person's access to a civil remedy. 
However, in this case, the most important clause is the last one 
in section 11, "any civil cause to which he is a party." 
(emphasis added). This section limits the power of the 
legislature and court to preclude a potential party from 
obtaining a judgment on a civil cause of action. Therefore, this 
provision has no bearing on the states authority or as the 
Appellant states, "standing," to prosecute its own citizen for 
violating a valid statute. 
IV. THE STATE HAS NOT ARBITRARILY CLASSIFIED BURTON NOR DENIED 
HER EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
a. Standard Of Review 
In her equal protection claim the Appellant has alleged an 
unconstitutional classification has deprived her of a fundamental 
right. Although Article I, § 2 has the equal protection 
language, it is more a statement of a purpose of government. 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 n.13 (Utah 1984). Article I, § 
24 is more the functional equivalent of the Federal equal 
protection clause. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 
P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991). Although the state and federal 
guarantees embody the same general principle, "different language 
. . . different constitutional contexts . . . and different 
jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different result . . 
. ." Id. There has been no allegation of a suspect class, thus 
the court must first determine if she has been deprived of a 
fundamental right. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant 
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has a fundamental i: igh t tc a jur y trial 01 :il y whei i accused :>f a 
serious offense. Duncan v, Louisiana, 391 U.s. 145, 88 s.ct, 
] 44] 20 I i Eel. 2d 491 (1968). The test then is to determine the 
location of "the line between 'petty1 .Mid 'serious1 1 ot. fenses] 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial." 
Baldwin
 v , New York, 399 II, S, <i(>, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1888, 
L.Ed.2d :°™V Tf the court determines there i s no depri vati .on 
of a fundamental right nor burden of a suspect group then the 
court need only ripply i <i t 11 »n«i I basis review. Vance v. Bradley
 f 
440 U.S. 93, 96-7, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-43, 59 L.Ed2d 171 (1979). 
Although the state test is more restrictive than the Federal 
test, "case ] a w cle vel oped I n ider the foi in teenth amendment may be 
persuasive in applying Article 1, § 24." Malan. at 670. 
"Article I, § 24 requires that law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class ami 1 • -.i.-Hutory . • 1 ass i f icat ions must 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives ?! the 
statt 1te " Greenwood, at 821. 
1 > Operating A Motor Vehicle without A V all i d License is 
Not A Serious Offense 
Operating a motor vehicle without a a. ;i driver's License, 
§ 41 -2-104 is not a "serious" crime for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right lo jui ) trial. "In deciding whether an offense 
is "petty,," we have found the most relevant such cri teria 
in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty." Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U S „ M„il(l ,1,8, 90 S.Ct, 188C), 1888,,, L.Ed.2d (1970). 
In Baldwin, the defendant appealed from conviction of a Class A 
misdemeanor of Jostling, which was punishable by up to 1 year in 
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prison. The Court held that "a possible six-month penalty is 
short enough to permit classification of the offense as 'petty.'" 
In the instant case, violation of § 41-2-104 in 1990 was a Class 
B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-137. (1988). The charge 
was subsequently reduced to a class C misdemeanor. The maximum 
penalty for a class C misdemeanor is "a term not exceeding ninety 
days." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(3) (1988). Thus, the crime of 
operating a vehicle without a license is a "petty" offense. 
Therefore, she has not been denied a fundamental right, see 
State v. Nuttall, 611 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1980), ("Since the 
present conviction falls within this category, i. e., a 
misdemeanor offense with maximum possible imprisonment of six-
months, the defendants have no federally protected right to a 
jury trial and, therefore, can claim no right to a six-member 
panel.") 
The law requiring a valid driver's license while driving an 
automobile is not an arbitrary classification. Classification of 
crimes and offenses at common law based on culpability and 
circumstances surrounding the act have been made prior to the 
drafting of the United States Constitution, see, C. Torcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Law, § 17 (1978), see also, Shick v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69, 24 S.Ct. 826, 827 (1904). The Federal 
Constitution discriminates between various criminal 
classifications, for example only infamous crimes must have a 
grand jury indictment. Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 
935 (1885). Thus, the proper classification for purposes of 
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Article lr § 2 4 it not i1! offenders of the law must be treated 
equally, but rather all operators of motor vehicles. In Barney 
v. Cox, the defendant, a taxi cab driver claimed the state 
arbitrarily classified tax.i drivers with fill drivers. Because 
taxi drivers are on the road more than other drivers, taxi 
drivers are denied equal protection when they have only the same 
point allotment as other drivers Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 69 6, 
697 (1978), The Utah Supreme Court held that "[t]he law provides 
that all. drivers a re to be treated equally." Id. The purpose of 
the statutes regulating those who have U-rn H I \/MI t hr- privilege 
of driving are designed to protect the public , " Id. By 
testing and '"' HSU i HCJ Mrensi > only those qualified drivers, the 
classification reasonably furthers the objectives of the statute. 
Therefore, by denying a jury trial in the prosecution of the 
appellant for dri v i aq with mi! n MIIMI license the state has not 
denied her equal protection of the law under Article i , % 2 4 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
c Classification that Remc Burder Proving Intent Is 
Mot Unconstitutional 
The State's classification thai removes t.he burden of 
proving intent is not a constitutionally protected right of the 
Appellant. "Neither, so far as we are aware, is there any 
constitutional prohibition against Jeqisl»i1 ive subsi il ution oi an 
admittedly unlawful status for the required criminal intent i« * 
ielony prosecution." State, v., Twitchell, 8 "Utah2d VI 4, 317, 
P.2d 1075, 1077 (1959). In Twitchell, the- defendant wn.s 
convicted of automobile homicide. Id., at 315, 1076, On appeal 
the defendant claimed the classification of intoxicated drivers 
that kill denied him of equal protection since the statute 
treated him differently than other intoxicated drivers. In 
addition, the defendant claimed the statute substituted a status 
of being intoxicated in place of criminal intent. Id., at 316, 
1077. The court held that "all that is required is that the 
statute apply equally to all members in the class and that as 
long as there is a valid reason for a classification by the 
legislature, their determination of the class will not be 
disturbed." Twitchell, at 316, 1077. In the instant case, § 41-
2-104 treats all members of the class equally, all operators must 
have a license. The state, pursuant to its inherent power to 
legislate health, safety, welfare and morals has a valid reason 
to regulate who can drive. Therefore, the classification that 
removes the burden from the state of proving intent is not 
unconstitutional. 
The Appellant also alleges a deprivation of a right that 
"requires the testimony of the injured party." Appellant's Brief 
at 9. Assuming she means deprivation of the right to confront 
the witness against her leads to unequal protection of the law, 
there has been no such deprivation. On the other hand, if she 
means that she has been charged unjustly because, there is no 
crime without an injured party then again she is mistaken. The 
state may prosecute a citizen of the state for a violation of its 
reasonable laws whether there is an 'injured party' or not. 
V. THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY PROVES BURTON'S GUILT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
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p Standard Of Re\ 
This issue presents a question of fact which requires a 
"clearly HrrririPiiuH" standard of review. State v. Moosman, 794 
P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990) "In order to show a i:leai error, the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
triai court'v finding.' of fart and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn I herefrom, is 
insufficient t support the findings against an attack." Id,, it 
4 7 5"7 in " • J * tne light most 
favorable * • r>- bindings of the trial court. Id* 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Proves Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt That Burton Operated A Vehicle On May 
25, 1990 Without A Valid Driver's License 
The evidence at ti nal pi oved beyond ii reasonable* doubt that 
the Appellant was guilty of violating § 41-2-104• The statute 
-^"-•" .-.. : peration of a motor vehicle, on a highway :i n Utah,!, 
without a valid license issued. I • •- * . DI: 
vehicles. Utah Code Ann, § 41-2-104 (1988). There are four 
exceptions lisiei in • lie statute, into which the appellant does 
not fit. First, she was not a non-resident. § 41 - 2 :i 08. 
Second, she did not possess a temporary learners permit. § 41-2-
111. possess a temporary license for 
processing. § 41-2-121(4). Fourth, she did not have «iii < HI f in.id 
safety permit. § 41-22-10.9, At trial the state introduced the 
officer fs Lebl.inu.iny I licit IK.11 observed lier operating the vehicle at 
the specified location and date. Record at 12, State v. Burton. 
The state then introduced the abstract of the driver's license to 
prove that she did not have a valid license on that date. Record 
at 12, State v. Burton. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that the 
appellant was operating a motor vehicle on a highway in Utah 
without a license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
Therefore, the evidence proves that Burton was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The state did not deny the Appellant the right to confront 
the witness against her. The testimony of Highway Patrol Trooper 
Christensen was not hearsay. The abstract of the license was an 
admissible self-authenticating document. Therefore, the 
Appellant was not denied the right to confront the witnesses 
against her pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Third Circuit Court properly had jurisdiction. When a 
state prosecutes its own citizen for violating its own statute 
according to Article III, § 1 the Federal courts don't have 
jurisdiction and therefore, the Supreme Court could not have 
original jurisdiction. 
The state has the authority to prosecute Appellant in this 
case. The State may prosecute a violation of its reasonable laws 
as a matter of sovereignty and regulating traffic is a reasonable 
exercise of its police power. Therefore, the state may prosecute 
those who violate § 41-2-104. 
The state has not denied Appellant the equal protection of 
the law. The penalty of the act the Appellant is accused of 
makes it a "petty" offense and therefore, the appellant has 
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ijained no fundamental i injlil to .i jury The procedures meet the 
equal protection clause standard because, the classification 
applies the laws to a] ] drivers equally and because, it has a 
reasonable tendency to fur ther a 1 egiti mate gov eriimont object 1 ve. 
Therefore, deprivation of the jury tri al and relieving the state 
of the burden of proving intent does not deprive the Appellant of 
equal protection of the laws. 
The testimony of the highway patrol trooper and the abstract 
i icense are admissible and the evidence proves all 
elements of the violation Therefore, the court should affirm 
the verdict of the Third Circuit Court. 
DATED th :i s *"day of August, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Kitty K. Burton, 
13700 South 7300 West, Riverton, Utah 84065 this 2& day of 
August, 1992. 
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